Experimental two-way communication with one photon by Massa, Francesco et al.
Experimental two-way communication with one photon
Francesco Massa1, Amir Moqanaki1, A¨min Baumeler2,5, Flavio Del
Santo1,2, Joshua A. Kettlewell3,4, Borivoje Dakic2, Philip Walther1
1Vienna Center for Quantum Science and Technology (VCQ), Faculty of Physics,
University of Vienna, Boltzmanngasse 5, Vienna A-1090, Austria
2Institute for Quantum Optics & Quantum Information (IQOQI),
Austrian Academy of Sciences, Boltzmanngasse 3, Vienna A-1090, Austria
3Singapore University of Technology and Design, 8 Somapah Road, Singapore 487372
4Centre for Quantum Technologies, National University of Singapore, 3 Science Drive, Singapore 117543 and
5Facolt Indipendente di Gandria, Lunga Scala, 6978 Gandria, Switzerland
Superposition of two or more states is one of the fundamental concepts of quantum mechanics and provides
the basis for several advantages offered by quantum information processing. In this work, we experimentally
demonstrate that quantum superposition allows for two-way communication between two distant parties that can
exchange only one particle once, an impossible task in classical physics. This is achieved by preparing a single
photon in a coherent superposition of the two parties’ locations. Furthermore, we show that this concept allows
the parties to perform secure and anonymous quantum communication employing one particle per transmitted
bit. These important features can lead to the realization of new quantum communication schemes, which are
simultaneously anonymous, secure and resource-efficient.
INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, developments in the study of quantum
information science have gained insights that promise to rev-
olutionise the future of information processing. Among them,
quantum communication is one of the earliest known applica-
tions demonstrating the clear advantage of quantum systems.
The transmission of quantum states, in fact, allows for com-
munication features that are not achievable with merely classi-
cal resources, such as information-theoretically secure quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) [1–5] or quantum secure direct
communication (QSDC) [6–8].
In terms of efficiency, it has been demonstrated, both the-
oretically and experimentally, that quantum protocols reduce
the information transfer required to perform some specific dis-
tributed computational tasks [9–15]. Some of these schemes
provide an exponential advantage with respect to their classi-
cal counterparts. At the same time, quantum systems allow
for a decrease in the amount of physical resources necessary
for communication [16–21].
Along these lines, a recent theoretical result [22] has shown
that, by means of quantum superposition, it is possible to
perform two-way communication between two distant parties
that only exchange a single particle. Such an operation is im-
possible in classical physics, where two-way communication
can be realised only if the parties exchange two particles, one
per party, or if the same particle goes back and forth between
them. Thus, for this specific task, quantum mechanics deter-
mines a reduction in number of particles to be used or, alter-
natively, in the time employed for the communication.
In this work, we experimentally demonstrate the two-way
signalling via superposition of single photons. Furthermore,
we advance the scheme proposed in [22] for performing
QSDC. Our method achieves information-theoretically secure
transfer of classical bits between two parties, given a shared
single-particle superposition state. With respect to other pro-
posed QSDC schemes [6], our protocol has two advantages:
1) the direction of communication between the parties is hid-
den, as for quantum anonymous communication [23–25], 2)
security is not affected by multi-photon emission. We exploit
the latter property to realize an implementation of the protocol
that is robust against losses.
Our results show that a feasible quantum resource, such
as superposition, allows for communication features that are
classically impossible and can support the development of
novel schemes.
TWO-WAY SIGNALLING WITH A SINGLE PHOTON
In order to show two-way signalling, we consider a com-
munication game in which a referee respectively assigns two
random input bits, x and y, to two distant communication par-
ties, named Alice and Bob, who are then allowed to exchange
one particle. We call τ the time it takes for the exchange to be
completed, that is the interval between the time at which the
particle leaves Alice’s or Bob’s location and the time at which
it is detected. We assume τ shorter than the time required to a
physical object to travel more than once the distance between
Alice and Bob (see figure 1). When the exchange is com-
pleted, the referee asks Alice and Bob to reveal two output
bits, a and b: they win the game if they both guess correctly
the value of the other player’s input (i.e. if a = y and b = x).
This game can be considered a variation of the well known
“guess your neighbour’s input” (GYNI) game [26]. Under
the constraint that the parties can only exchange one particle
within the time window τ , only two possible causal relations
between variables x, y, a and b, are possible: either x influ-
ences a and b, whereas y influences b only (corresponding to a
one-way communication from Alice to Bob) or y influences a
and b, whereas x influences a only (one-way communication
from Bob to Alice). Accordingly, the joint probability distri-
bution p(ab|xy) results in a classical mixture of the two one-
way signalling distributions. This imposes a maximal proba-
bility value of 1/2 of winning the game [27].
Let us now consider the case of a single quantum parti-
cle prepared in a coherent superposition between Alice’s and
Bob’s respective locations:
|ψin〉 = 1√
2
(â† + b̂†)|0〉, (1)
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2Figure 1 Diagrams of communication between two distant parties.
Classically, a single carrier travelling with finite speed, bounded by the
speed of light c, can transmit information either from Alice to Bob (blue
arrow) or from Bob to Alice (red arrow) only, if the time τ allowed for the
communication is shorter than the time the carrier takes to travel more than
once the distance between Alice and Bob (space-time diagram on the left).
An information carrier in quantum superposition permits to overcome this
limitation and carry out a two-way communication process (scheme on the
right).
where â† and b̂† are the particle creation operators at Alice’s
and Bob’s location, respectively, and |0〉 is the vacuum state.
Alice and Bob encode the bits x and y in the phase of the
particle, obtaining the state:
|ψencode〉 = 1√
2
((−1)x â† + (−1)y b̂†)|0〉. (2)
A 50/50 beam splitter is placed at the centre of the path be-
tween Alice and Bob. The action of the beam splitter can be
expressed by the following transformations:
â† −→ 1√
2
(â† + b̂†), (3)
b̂† −→ 1√
2
(â† − b̂†). (4)
Due to interference, after the device the final state of the pho-
ton is:
|ψfin〉 =

â†|0〉, if x = 0 and y = 0,
b̂†|0〉, if x = 0 and y = 1,
−b̂†|0〉, if x = 1 and y = 0,
−â†|0〉, if x = 1 and y = 1.
(5)
This means that, by checking whether they detect the particle
or not, Alice and Bob can infer the parity, r, of x and y. This
piece of information, combined to the knowledge of their in-
put bits, allows them to ideally win the game with probability
1, thus showing genuine two-way communication.
APPLICATION FOR ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION
We now present a secure two-party quantum communica-
tion protocol that provides anonymity of the direction of com-
munication between Alice and Bob. This is achieved via im-
plementation of the previously described two-way communi-
cation scheme as a primitive. As communication via the pro-
tocol is two-way, we convert this to a direct message system
by allowing only one party to transmit a message at a time,
and the other to transmit only random bits.
Our protocol makes an implicit assumption that Alice and
Bob share a quantum channel and many copies of the required
superposition state, |ψin〉, which is known to be a powerful re-
course for secure communication [28]. Such states could be
supplied on demand via a trusted server assuming the channel
between the server and Alice, and the server and Bob, are se-
cure to a possible eavesdropper. Alternatively, they could be
in theory produced and stored by the two parties when they
meet and then used at a later moment. Prior to the protocol,
each state |ψin〉 shared between the parties is labelled with
index i.
For each round of communication, i, both Alice and Bob
perform local phase operations |ψencode〉i = 1√2 ((−1)xi â†+
(−1)yi b̂†) |0〉 to encode bits xi and yi, respectively. Both
send their part of the state |ψencode〉i via the quantum channel
and detect any returning photon. Detection of a photon reveals
the parity bit ri = xi ⊕ yi to each party. Assuming Alice
wishes to send an M -bit message {X1, . . . , XM} to Bob, the
protocol can be described by the following sequence of steps:
1. Decline communication. If no message is to be sent,
Alice and Bob select the bits xi and yi uniformly at
random.
2. Declaration of the communication direction. Alice
initializes communication via setting xi = 1 for d iter-
ations of the protocol, where d is chosen as to be suffi-
ciently large as to be sufficiently improbable to occur by
chance. Detection of d repeated xi = 1 results by Bob
indicates that Alice intends to send a message. Should
Bob simultaneously declare his intention to communi-
cate, the protocol is aborted.
3. Transmission of the message. Alice sets xi = Xi, for
i going from 1 to M . Bob may or may not detect a
photon, thus obtaining the parity value ri = yi ⊕ Xi,
from which the bit Xi can be deduced.
4. Declaration of the end of the message. To end the
message transmission, Alice sends xi = 0 for d itera-
tions of the protocol. Alice and Bob return to step 1.
The description of the scheme makes no assumption on the
power of an eavesdropper, allowing for information-theoretic
security. Interception of a photon between the two parties will
leak exactly the parity between xi and yi, given by the position
of the photon after the interference at the central beam splitter.
This may be observed as the four possible states of |ψencode〉
form two pairs that are identical under global phases, which
cannot be observed via measurement. As such, only a single
bit of information may be obtained by an eavesdropper. As
each bit yi is chosen uniformly at random, this bit contains no
information about xi, provided that yi is unknown, and thus
leaks no information regarding Alice’s message bit Xi. Bob’s
input thus acts as a random one-time pad. As communication
is two-way, pad bits yi are also obtained by Alice, and as such
the scheme is anonymous in the direction of the message and
3pad. A detailed security analysis of the protocol is provided
in appendix E.
Such a system may be easily altered to become resistant to
experimental losses within a realistic implementation. Losses
caused by an erasure channel may result in no photon being
detected by Bob when required, causing a single bit error in
the received message. Additional errors may be caused by
imperfections in the experimental set-up, such as dephasing
or non-optimal interference visibility. However, errors can be
overcome, without compromising security, by adding redun-
dancy to the protocol, as discussed in appendices D and E.
Experimentally, this type of error correction requires no fast
switching elements if channel losses are high, greatly simpli-
fying practical applications.
In contrast to other quantum communication schemes, the
security of the protocol is preserved even in the case of simul-
taneous multi-photon emission from the source, as shown in
appendix E (Theorem 1). This underlines the feasibility of our
protocol when using realistic single-photon sources.
Although anonymous communication may be performed
between two parties via use of shared classical data, our
method demonstrates the power of a superposition state as a
resource for communication.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Implementation of the communication game
The set-up for the implementation of the communication
game is shown in figure 2. A heralded single photon is sent
to one of the input ports of a first beam splitter, which puts
the photon in a superposition state between Alice’s and Bob’s
locations. Then, Alice and Bob encode their bits in the phase
of the photon and direct it to a second beam splitter, which
creates the final state |ψfin〉. This scheme represents a Mach-
Zehnder interferometer.
In order to prove that each photon cannot be exchanged
more than once between the two parties, we measure the de-
lay between two events: the reception of the photon before the
encoding and the final detection after the second beam split-
ter. Actually, there are four delays to be measured, according
to whether the initial reception and the final detection of the
photon are considered at Alice or Bob. The delays are slightly
different due to the fact that the implemented interferometer
is rectangular. The results of these measurements are shown
in table I. It can be seen that, in all the cases, the time τ neces-
sary for the photon exchange to be completed is shorter than
the time the photon would take to travel twice the minimum
distance between Alice and Bob (reference time) by more than
three standard deviations. This excludes the possibility that
the photon travels back and forth between Alice and Bob with
less than 1% risk. More details about the adopted measure-
ment method and the data analysis can be found in appendix
B.
We estimate the probability of winning the game by using
a random sequence of 100 input bit pairs, one every 0.5 s.
In this time interval, we register an average number of pho-
ton detections of about 15 × 103. For each bit pair, there-
fore, we compute the probability of success by counting how
many photons go to the “right” output. We then average
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D   Single Photon Detector
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Figure 2 Experimental set-up. Single-photon pairs are produced
through spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC). For each pair,
one photon is used to herald the presence of the other one, which is sent to a
Mach-Zehnder interferometer. Alice and Bob occupy the area around the
mirrors MA and MB, where, for each of them, a liquid-crystal phase shifter,
for phase encoding, and a photon detector are placed. After the second beam
splitter, the photons can travel to Alice or Bob, according to the parity of the
input bits. Removable mirrors are used to measure the time at which Alice
and Bob receive the photons from the source for the purposes explained in
the main text. These mirrors steer light to fibers that can be connected to
either Alice’s or Bob’s detector. For more details about the set-up, we refer
to appendix A.
Initial Reception Final Detection  Delay (ns)
Alice Alice 7.1  ±  0.4
Alice Bob 8.2  ±  0.4
Bob Alice 7.5  ±  0.3
Bob Bob 8.5  ±  0.4
Reference time: (10.1  ±  0.1) ns
Table I Time measurement results. The four possible delays between
the initial reception and the final detection of the photon at Alice or Bob are
shown in the table. They are compared to the time the photon would take to
travel twice the minimum distance between the two parties, roughly equal to
the diagonal of the interferometer, at the speed of light in vacuum (reference
value). For each delay, the measurements are taken by unblocking only the
corresponding path and recording the arrival-time statistical distributions for
reception and final detection, respectively. The uncertainty on the delays are
obtained from the standard deviations of the associated arrival-time
distributions, dominated by the time jitter of our detectors. The uncertainty
on the reference value is not statistical and is determined by the
measurement of the minimum distance between Alice and Bob.
the probability over the input sequence. Figure 3 shows the
measured success probability for different values of the in-
terferometric visibility in our Mach-Zehnder, averaged over
the two output ports. The visibility at each port is defined as
(NMAX − NMIN )/(NMAX + NMIN ), where NMAX and
NMIN are the maximum and minimum number of detections
at that port. The success probability surpasses the classical
limit as soon as the visibility is greater than zero. For our
maximally achieved visibility of 0.941 ± 0.007, we observe
the maximal success probability of 0.961 ± 0.006. At zero
visibility the success probability is 0.498 ± 0.006, compara-
ble with the maximal achievable value in the classical case
(0.5). At this point, the effect of the quantum superposition is
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Figure 3 Success probability vs interferometric visibility. The plot
shows the behaviour of the probability of winning the game with respect to
the quality of the single-photon interference produced by the state Alice and
Bob share, which is quantified by the average interferometric visibility. The
visibility is varied by delaying one interferometric path with respect to the
other: at zero visibility the two photon wave packets travelling in the two
arms no longer overlap at the final beam splitter and the interference is
completely cancelled. The equation of the red theoretical curve is
y = 0.5(x+ 1). The error on each probability is the standard error on the
mean, obtained from the statistical variation over the sequence of input bits.
For each point in the plot, a different random input sequence of bit pairs is
generated.
totally nullified.
In order to claim implementation of a two-way communica-
tion protocol with a single particle, we are required to demon-
strate that Alice and Bob cannot share two or more photons at
the same time. This can be shown by measuring the heralded
second-order correlation function at zero delay of our photon-
pair source, g(2)(0) [29]. This is a number between 0 and
1, quantifying the amount of multi-photon emission from the
source. A value of g(2)(0) closer to 1 would imply that two
or more photons are sent simultaneously to the interferometer.
For an ideal heralded single-photon source this number is 0.
We measure g(2)(0) = 0.004 ± 0.010, which is statistically
compatible to 0 and in line with the lowest values obtained in
quantum optics experiment [30]. For more details about how
this value was obtained we refer to appendix C.
Implementation of the anonymous communication protocol
We experimentally demonstrate an application of the
anonymous communication protocol with a probabilistic pho-
ton source and majority voting error-correction procedure.
Although the distribution of the superposition states is per-
formed here by a trusted third party, our method allows us to
anonymously send an image between two parties in a manner
secure to any eavesdropper acting only between them.
The communication protocol employs the set-up described
in the previous section and depicted in figure 2. A communi-
cation interval of 0.5 s is set for each pair of bits xi and yi, and
the source emission rate is reduced so as to have an average of
approximately three detection events per communication in-
terval. Here we consider the sum of the detections Alice and
Bob record. If Alice (Bob) receives one or more photons dur-
ing a given communication interval, she (he) infers that ri = 0
Figure 4 Example of secure communication. An example in which
Alice sends a message in the form of a figure and Bob a random sequence
with the same length is presented. The three columns report, in the order, the
figure sent by Alice, the figure received by Bob and the parity of the bits sent
by Alice and Bob, the only piece of information an eavesdropper, Eve, can
obtain from the superposition state. Two cases are shown: the basic protocol,
where each bit pair is sent once with an average probability of success of
88% and the error-corrected protocol, where each bit pair is sent five times,
with an average probability of success of 100%.
(= 1), and ri = 1 (= 0) otherwise. In appendix E we demon-
strate security of the protocol under such conditions. The
reader should note that, as the experimental setup heralds the
photon in the interferometer with a non-number-resolving de-
tector, potential higher-order-emission terms from the source
are statistically mixed. As discussed in appendix E, this does
not affect security. Errors occur if in a given interval at least
one photon goes to the “wrong” output or when no photon
is detected by both Alice and Bob at the end of the interval.
Such errors can be minimized by suitably choosing the av-
erage number of detections per interval (see appendix D for
more details). When the error probability per bit, pb, is lower
than 50%, the majority-voting error-correction code can be
applied to further increase the success probability of the pro-
tocol. It consists in repeating the same message bit over N
communication intervals and selecting the outcome that oc-
curs more often. We provide an example by implementing
simple schemes with N = 3 and N = 5. The average success
probability of the communication protocol without majority-
vote procedure, measured by counting the successful trans-
mission events for different random sets of 100 bit pairs, is
0.88 ± 0.01. By implementing the error-correction schemes
with three and five repetitions per bit pair, we obtain success
probabilities of 0.93± 0.01 and 1.00/− 0.01, respectively.
We report an example where Alice sends a 10 pixels× 10 pix-
els image in black and white, corresponding to 100 bits, and
Bob sends a sequence of 100 random bits. Figure 4 shows the
outcome of the communication both for the basic protocol and
for the error-corrected one with five repetitions per bit pair.
DISCUSSION
We have experimentally demonstrated that, by using quan-
tum superposition, it is possible to perform two-way com-
munication between two parties that exchange only a sin-
gle photon. The possibility that the photon travels back and
forth between them or that two or more photons are simul-
5taneously used is strictly ruled out by our implementation.
Furthermore, we have designed and implemented a protocol
for anonymous messaging via utilising two-way communi-
cation as a primitive, and shown that the method achieves
information-theoretic security while being not compromised
by photon losses and multi-photon emission. The security
of our protocol is based on the impossibility of measuring
the global phase for single photons. We, therefore, show a
novel utilization of basic quantum-mechanical phenomena for
communication. Future developments hold the promise to ap-
proach real-world applications based on the recent progress in
bright deterministic single-photon sources [31], fast and low-
loss optical switches [32] and high-efficiency single-photon
detection [33]. Recently, QKD schemes based on phase en-
coding have raised great interest in the quantum cryptography
community, because of providing a secure key rate that scales
with the square root of the communication channel transmis-
sion [34, 35]. These protocols present some connections with
ours, as they also employ relative-phase detection through
first-order interference. However, their purpose is different
from direct communication and they make use of coherent
states, meaning that security is not based on the properties
of fixed-photon-number states. Nevertheless, both lines of
research show the importance of finding alternative commu-
nication schemes that can be advantageous over the current
ones. From this perspective, examining in depth the relation
between the two works can be beneficial for future investiga-
tions.
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APPENDIX A: THE EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP
The single-photon source
We use an SPDC-based single-photon source in a Sagnac
configuration [36], with a 20-mm-long periodically-poled
potassium tytanyl phosphate (PPKTP) crystal. The Sagnac
loop is realized using a dual-wavelength polarizing beam
splitter and two mirrors. The crystal converts a photon at 395
nm into two photons at 790 nm and orthogonal polarizations.
The produced photons are coupled into single-mode fibers:
one of them is sent to the Mach-Zehnder interferometer and
the other is directly sent to a silicon avalanche photo-diode
(APD) for heralding the presence of its twin in the interfer-
ometer. The use of polarizers for both photons of each pair
ensures that a defined polarization state is produced, in partic-
ular |H〉|V 〉, where H stands for “horizontal” and V for “ver-
tical”).
The interferometric set-up
The interferometer we built is depicted in figure 1 in the
main text. The distance between the mirror MA and the beam
splitter BS2 is (106 ± 1) cm, whereas the distance between
MB and BS2 is (119±1) cm. The minimum distance between
the regions occupied by Alice and Bob is the distance between
the sides of the liquid-crystal phase shifters, equal to (156 ±
1) cm. The geometry of the interferometer is chosen so as
to maximize the difference between the time photons take to
travel from mirrors MA and MB to the detectors and the time
they would take to travel twice the minimum distance between
Alice and Bob, given the limits of space on our optical table.
The two flip mirrors FMA and FMB are placed at 10.0 cm
of distance from MA and MB, respectively. They are used to
steer light to two fiber couplers, CA and CB, connected to two
2-m-long multi-mode fibers. The coupling in the multi-mode
fibers is about 96%. The distance between the flip mirrors
and the couplers is also 10.0 cm, so that photons reach the
fibers at the same time they would arrive at MA and MB if
FMA and FMB were not inserted. The uncertainty on all these
distances is estimated to be 0.5 cm. The detectors DA and DB
are silicon APDs. We use them in a free-space configuration
for the final detection of the photons but we connect them to
the fibers from the couplers for the acquisition of the photon
arrival-time distributions at the mirrors MA and MB. All the
arrival times are measured by means of two different time-tag
logic units, one for each detector, and are always referred to
the detection of the heralding photon, used as a trigger.
The interferometer is passively stabilized by thermal and
vibrational isolation so that the phase between the two arms
is stable for about one minute. After this time, the phase can
be re-set by means of a piezo actuator mounted in a trombone
delay line, which can be used to delay one arm with respect
to the other and therefore to change the interference visibility.
We re-set the piezo every 50 input bit pairs, corresponding to
about 25 s. There are still some residual fluctuations of the
phase around the stability point in this time interval, which,
together with the standard poissonian fluctuations in the num-
ber of counts, determine the errors on the success probabilities
reported in the main text.
The polarization of the photons entering the interferometer
is set to “horizontal” (H), that means parallel to the optical
table, before BS1 by means of two waveplates and a polar-
izer. The slow axes of the two liquid-crystal phase shifters are
aligned to the photon polarization. The refractive index along
these axes depends on the voltage applied to the liquid crystal.
We characterize the phase-shift with respect to the voltage and
set a phase-shift of 0 to encode the bit 0” and of pi to encode
the bit 1”.
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ARRIVAL-TIME DISTRIBUTIONS
Let us call ∆tAB the time photons take to travel from the
mirror MA to the detector DB along the arms of the interfer-
ometer. In the same way we call ∆tAA, ∆tBA, ∆tBB the time
photons take to go from MA to DA, from MB to DA and from
MB to DB, respectively. The procedure to measure ∆tAB is
the following:
1. we block all the possible paths for the photons except
for that one going from MA to DB.
2. For each photon pair, we register the delay between the
detection of the heralding photon and the detection of
its correlated photon at DB, after it travels through the
interferometer. In this way we acquire the arrival-time
distribution for the final detection at DB, referred to the
herald detection.
3. We turn up the flip mirror FMA and connect the multi-
mode fiber from the coupler CA to the detector DB. Af-
ter correcting for the delay introduced by the fiber, we
acquire the arrival-time distribution at MA, as in point
2.
4. We fit the two obtained distributions with gaussian
functions and, for each of them, we consider the mean
value and the standard deviation.
5. We calculate ∆tAB as the difference of the mean val-
ues of the two distributions. Since the detections take
place at the same detector and we use the same time-
tag unit, the difference is not affected by further elec-
tronic delays. The error on ∆tAB is obtained by adding
in quadrature the standard deviations of the two distri-
butions.
For the measurement of ∆tAA, ∆tBA and ∆tBB, we fol-
low analogous procedures. In order to correct the delays
introduced by the multi-mode fibers, their length is mea-
sured with a fiber-meter. We obtain (2.080 ± 0.004) m and
(2.088 ± 0.004) m for the fibers connected to CA and CB,
respectively. The refractive index of the core, made of pure
silica, is taken from [37]. The errors on the fiber lengths and
on the refractive index are negligible with respect to the stan-
dard deviations of the arrival time distributions. Supplemen-
tary Figure 1 shows the acquired arrival-time distributions, to-
gether with the related gaussian fits.
Our detectors are single-photon counting modules from Ex-
celitas, model SPCM-AQRH. This model has a typical jitter
time (standard deviation) of 0.149 ns. Since each peak is ob-
tained by coincidence detection between two modules, if we
consider only the effect of the jitter, we expect a standard de-
viation of 0.210 ns. This value is compatible with those ob-
tained for fiber-coupled detection but significantly lower than
those obtained in case of free-space detection. We ascribe the
mismatch to the imperfect alignment of the beam in the case
of free-space detection.
As it can be seen from table 1 in the main text, the quantity
|∆tX −∆tref|/σX is always above 3, where ∆tcomp is the ref-
erence value and X can be AA, AB, BA or BB, respectively.
This allows us to claim with less than 1% of risk that the two
values are not compatible and then that the time the photons
take to go from the mirror MA or MB to the detector is shorter
than the time they would take to travel twice the minimum
distance between Alice and Bob. In this procedure of compar-
ison we neglect the error on ∆tcomp because the corresponding
relative error is more than 4 times lower than that on any ∆tX.
APPENDIX C: MEASUREMENT OF THE SECOND-ORDER
CORRELATION FUNCTION AT ZERO DELAY
In order to measure the heralded second-order correlation
function at zero delay, g(2)(0), we steer the photons to the
couplers CA and CB, by means of the flip mirrors FMA and
FMB, and we connect the related fibers to the detectors DA and
DB. We consider the two-fold coincidence rates between the
detection of the heralding photon and the detection of its cor-
related photon at DA or DB, which we call respectively CCHA
and CCHB, and the three-fold coincidence rate, CCHAB. We
set the delays between the detections electronically in order to
maximize CCHA and CCHB and in these conditions we evalu-
ate g(2)(0), according to the following formula([38]):
g(2)(0) =
2× CH × CCHAB
(CCHA + CCHB)2
, (6)
where CH is the single-count rate for the heralding photons.
We average the rates over 3 minutes and obtain g(2)(0) =
0.004 ± 0.01, where the error is calculated from poissonian
uncertainty on the count rates. This value is measured for 7
mW of pump power in the source.
APPENDIX D: ERROR CORRECTION
The error-correction procedure presented in the main text
consists in repeating the encoding of each bit N times, with
N odd, and performing majority voting, meaning that the re-
sult occurring at least N+12 times is chosen. If the probability
of error per bit is pb, the overall probability of error after N
repetitions, pe, is given by:
pe =
N∑
k=N+12
(
N
k
)
pkb (1− pb)N−k. (7)
In figure 5 we show the behaviour of pe with respect to N
for different values of pb. It is clear that the higher is pb, the
slower pe goes to 0. When pb = 0.5, pe is independent of N
and for pb > 0.5 the majority-voting procedure only worsens
the probability of success.
We also consider the minimum amount of iterations Nt
necessary for pe to be below a threshold value t. In figure
6, we plot the dependence of Nt on pb for t = 0.01. This
trend is shown in figure 3. We can observe that Nt → ∞
as pb approaches 0.5 but it does not increase dramatically for
pb ≤ 0.3.
In practice, imperfect detection efficiency and fiber trans-
mission losses can severely reduce pb, thus compromising the
success rate of the protocol. In order to circumvent this prob-
lem, it is possible to use multiple copies of the resource state
7Figure 5 pe vs N . The plot shows the overall error probability after N
repetitions for different values of pb. The slope of the curve reduces as pb
approaches 0.5.
Figure 6 Nt vs pb. For this plot the threshold is set to 0.01. It can be
noticed that Nt starts increasing significantly for pb > 0.3.
|ψin〉 and proceed as follows: for each communication inter-
val, if Alice (Bob) detects at least one photon, she (he) as-
sumes that the parity bit is 0 (1).
For our implementation, we use an SPDC-based heralded
single-photon source. In each communication interval the
source emits ne photons at different times, of which n are
detected. We assume the photon-detection statistics are pois-
sonian. The probability that Alice and Bob together detect n
photons is therefore:
p(n) = e−m
mn
n!
, (8)
with m average number of detections.
There are three possible cases in which an error occurs in
a given interval: 1) no photon is detected at all, 2) both Alice
and Bob detect photons, 3) all photons go to the wrong output.
In case 1 Alice (Bob) always infers a value of “1”(“0”) for the
parity bit. The two values are swapped in case 2. Since the
parity bit is random, this produces an error in the message bit
transmission 50% of the times. In case 3 the wrong message
bit is transferred 100% of the times. This results in:
pb =
p(0)
2
+
pdAB
2
+ paw, (9)
where p(0), pdAB and paw are the probabilities of cases 1, 2
and 3, respectively. We have:
pdAB =
∞∑
n=2
p(n)
∞∑
k=1
(
n
k
)
(1− ps)kpn−ks = (10)
= 1 + p(0)−
∞∑
n=0
p(n)pns −
∞∑
n=0
p(n)(1− ps)n
paw =
∞∑
n=1
p(n)(1− ps)n = (11)
=
∞∑
n=0
p(n)(1− ps)n − p(0),
where ps is the success probability per photon, that is the
probability a photon is detected at the right output.
By using the last two equations in expression 9 and expliciting
p(n), we obtain, after some simple passages:
pb =
1
2
(1 + e−mps − e−m(1−ps)). (12)
This expression tends to 12 for m → 0, when the term p(0)2
becomes dominant, and for m → ∞, when the main contri-
bution to pb is given by pdAB . In between these two regimes,
pb has a minimum at:
moptm =
1
2ps − 1 log(
ps
1− ps ). (13)
In some situations, one might wish to optimize the proba-
bility both Alice and Bob bits are correctly transferred. An
error on the bit-pair transmission occurs any time no photon
is detected at all or at least one photon in the encoding interval
comes out at the “wrong” port. If we call pw the probability of
the latter case, the probability of error on the bit-pair transfer
is:
pbpair = p(0) + pw (14)
By expliciting p(0) and pw, we obtain:
pbpair = p(0) +
∞∑
n=1
p(n)(1− pns ) = (15)
= 1 + e−m − e−m(1−ps).
This expression tends to 1 for m → 0 and m →∞ and has a
minimum for:
moptp = − log(1− ps)
ps
. (16)
We note that the distance between moptm and moptp tends to
0 as ps tends to 1.
Since the value of ps for our set-up is approximately 0.95,
we calculate that moptm and moptp are both around 3. We
reduce the pump power of our source until we obtain globally
about 3 detections per communication interval.
We measure a success probability of the protocol, 1 − pb,
of 0.88 ± 0.01 over 10 sets of 100 random pairs of bits. The
error is calculated by considering the standard deviation of the
8probability over the sets and by dividing it by the square root
of the number of sets, thus obtaining an error on the average
value. The average number of detections, m and the proba-
bility of success per photon, ps, over the sets are respectively
3.34 ± 0.06 and 0.935 ± 0.008. By inserting these values in
our poissonian model, we calculate a theoretical success prob-
ability of 0.88±0.01, perfectly compatible with the measured
value. We note that, considering ps = 0.935, the maximal
theoretical success probability is 0.881, for m = 3.061.
In the same experimental conditions the probability 1 −
pbpair is measured to be 0.75 ± 0.02, with an expected value
of 0.77± 0.02.
We implement the majority-voting error-correction scheme
with three and five repetitions per bit pair. In both cases we
average over four sets of 100 bit pairs, for a total of 1200 and
2000 iterations, respectively. In the case of three repetitions,
we obtain a success probability of 0.93± 0.01. The expected
value in this case is 0.969 ± 0.004, considering that we mea-
sure m = 2.62 ± 0.05 and ps = 0.948 ± 0.006. For the case
of five repetitions, the measured success probability results to
be 1.00 ± 0.01 while the expected value is 0.995 ± 0.001,
with the measurement results m = 3.736 ± 0.004 and ps =
0.960 ± 0.004. All the measured values are compatible with
the expected ones, thus confirming the validity of our theoret-
ical model.
APPENDIX E: SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE
ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL
The anonymous communication protocol is information-
theoretically secure under noise, losses, and repetitive trans-
mission. Without loss of generality this analysis is done for
communication from Alice to Bob only. The other direction of
communication is covered by symmetry. The analysis, overall
performed for noisy protocol executions and potential multi-
photon emissions, covers three steps: First, we show secu-
rity in the case with losses, then we model the probabilistic
photon source as has been used in the experimental setup and
show security in that case, and finally we show security for
the repetition code where multiple rounds are used in order
to reliably transmit a single bit. Once we achieve secure and
reliable transmission of a single bit, multi-bit messages can
be transmitted securely and reliably by repeating the protocol.
Integrity and authenticity can be achieved by the use of mes-
sage authentication, which, however, needs some pre-shared
randomness between the parties.
We prove security in the ideal-real model (also known as
the simulator model). The ideal cryptographic primitive we
want to implement is a secure transmission of a bit x from
Alice to Bob. An adversary, in this ideal scenario, does not
learn anything about x; she or he only learns that the primitive
has been used. The real scenario, then again, is the protocol
as explained above. If the adversary cannot distinguish a real
protocol execution from the ideal one, then the real protocol is
called secure. In other words, if the adversary can simulate the
data he or she sees in a real execution from the ideal primitive
(no access to the inputs), then the real protocol is secure. This
notion is covered by the following definition.
Definition 1 (Approximate security). We call the proto-
col (1− δ)-secure if there exists some density operator τ such
that for every input x from Alice we have
∆(τ, σ) ≤ δ, where ∆(·, ·) is the trace distance and σ is the
density operator a potential eavesdropper has access to.
Note that a (1 − δ)-secure protocol implies that the eaves-
dropper can guess Alice’s bit x not better than with prob-
ability 1/2 + δ. This follows, because δ ≥ ∆(τ, σ) ≥∑
x′ |P (x′) − 1/2|/2 = (2P (x) − 1)/2, where, given τ , the
probability of guessing x is 1/2, and given σ, the probability
of guessing x is P (x) ≥ 1/2.
Throughout the analysis we will consider noisy and lossy
resource states, which motivates the statement of the follow-
ing definition.
Definition 2 (Security parameter (noise) and loss). A resource
state ρν has security parameter ν if
min
n,|ψ〉∈span({(aˆ†)k(bˆ†)n−k|0〉 | 0≤k≤n}):
〈ψ |ψ〉=1
∆ (|ψ〉 〈ψ| , ρν) ≤ ν .
(17)
A resource state ρν,λ with λ loss is (1 − λ)ρν + λ |0〉 〈0|,
where |0〉 〈0| is the vacuum state.
The security parameter reflects how much an adversary
might learn about the bit x. Note that this does not depend
on the number of photons generated; hence, the protocol is
resistant against multi-photon emissions. As will be shown
in the proof, if the resource state lies in the span of having k
photons with Alice and n − k with Bob (for some fixed n),
then the protocol is perfectly secure. The definition for lossy
resource states is done in agreement with the theoretical letter
[22]. For the analysis, it is helpful to consider the pure version
of the protocol: All but the last operations are unitary. In the
last step, Bob measures his registers, which consist of a space
containing any number of particles from 0 to n and his ran-
dom setting, with some appropriate observable. To generate
the random one-time pad, Bob uses the |+〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2
state and encodes that setting with a unitary operation. The
randomness is generated by measuring that register.
Theorem 1. For given ν and λ, the protocol is (1−(1−λ)ν)-
secure.
Proof. Let ρν,λ be the resource state, and σν,λ be the state an
adversary has access to. We first use the triangle inequality of
the trace distance:
∆
(
τ, σν,λ
) ≤ ∆ (τ, σ0,λ)+ ∆ (σ0,λ, σν,λ) . (18)
There exists some τ that makes the first expression on the right
equal to 0: The reduced state σ0,λ after tracing over Alice’s in-
put and Bob’s randomness is independent of x. This is shown
in the following calculation, where |ψ〉 is the n-photon state
that minimizes the security parameter ν. Having |ψ〉 as re-
source state, the initial state of the protocol is
|ψ〉 ⊗ |+〉 ⊗ |x〉 =
(
n∑
k=0
αk
(
aˆ†
)k (
bˆ†
)n−k
|0〉
)
⊗ |+〉 ⊗ |x〉 ,
(19)
where the last register is Alice’s message register and the one
before Bob’s one-time-pad register. After the parties encode
9their bits, the state is transformed to
1√
2
(
n∑
k=0
αk(−1)kx
(
aˆ†
)k (
bˆ†
)n−k
|0〉
)
⊗ |0〉 ⊗ |x〉+
(20)
+
1√
2
(
n∑
k=0
αk(−1)kx+(n−k)
(
aˆ†
)k (
bˆ†
)n−k
|0〉
)
⊗ |1〉 ⊗ |x〉 .
By tracing over the message space and the randomness reg-
ister, we obtain σ0,λ, which is
1
2
n∑
k,k′=0
(
(−1)(k+k′)x + (−1)(k+k′)x+2n−k−k′
)
αkα
∗
k′ ...
(21)
...
(
aˆ†
)k (
bˆ†
)n−k
|0〉 〈0|
(
bˆ
)n−k′
(aˆ)
k′
=
=
∑
k,k′=0
k+k′ is even
αkα
∗
k′
(
aˆ†
)k (
bˆ†
)n−k
|0〉 〈0|
(
bˆ
)n−k′
(aˆ)
k′
.
The second expression on the right, then again, can be
bounded by using the fact that the trace distances does not
increase under any completely-positive trace-preserving map
and by using the strong-convexity property:
∆
(
σ0,λ, σν,λ
) ≤ ∆ (ρ0,λ, ρν,λ) ≤ (22)
≤ (1− λ)∆ (|ψ〉 〈ψ| , ρν,0)+ λ∆ (ρ0,1, ρν,1) ≤ (1− λ)ν .
The term ∆(ρ0,1, ρν,1) is 0: Both density operators represent
the vacuum state.
Note that if the resource state is a mixture of resource states
with different photon numbers, then the protocol remains se-
cure, unless the purification registers are leaked to the eaves-
dropper.
Now, let us discuss the security for the protocol as it is im-
plemented. The experimental setup uses a probabilistic pho-
ton source that generates k particles, where that number is
Poisson distributed with mean value m.
Theorem 2. If the single-particle protocol is (1 − δ)-secure
then the use of a probabilistic photon source with mean
valuem renders the protocol (1−mδ)-secure.
Proof. Let ρ′ be the single-particle resource state that makes
the single-particle protocol (1 − δ)-secure, and let τ be the
simulated view of the eavesdropper. The resource state gener-
ated by the probabilistic photon source is
ρ′PPS =
∞∑
k=0
p(k)ρ′⊗k . (23)
A potential eavesdropper, in this case, has access to the re-
duced state σ′PPS =
∑∞
k=0 p(k)
⊗k
i=0 σ
′
i,k, where σ
′
i,k is the
state of the i-th particle in the case k particles have been gener-
ated. Define by τPPS the state
∑∞
k=0 p(k)τ
⊗k. Due to strong-
convexity and subadditivity we have
∆ (τPPS, σ
′
PPS) ≤
∞∑
k=0
p(k)∆
(
τ⊗k,
k⊗
i=0
σ′i,k
)
≤
∞∑
k=0
p(k)kδ = mδ .
(24)
Finally, we discuss the repetition code: N (odd) successive
rounds are performed where Alice always transmits the same
bit x and Bob uses the majority of the detected values as his
guess — a form of error correction.
Theorem 3. If the protocol is (1 − δ)-secure then the repe-
tition code with N repetitions makes the protocol (1 − Nδ)-
secure.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the last. Due to the secu-
rity of the single-run protocol there exists some τ , indepen-
dent of x, such that ∆ (τ, σ) ≤ δ, where σ is the state the
eavesdropper has access to. Denote by σi the i-th state the
eavesdropper has access to. Then
∆
(
τ⊗N ,
N⊗
i=1
σi
)
≤ Nδ . (25)
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